Methodological and Theoretical Pluralism

Before and after the ESA conference in Athens I presented preliminary findings in two seminars:

– Travel and Cultural Experience: Narratives from North and South Europe, University of Helsinki, Department of Social Research, 23/08/2017.

– From the Grand Tour to the Study Tour: International Students’ Narratives. TCuPS (University of Tampere Research Group for Cultural and Political Sociology), 19/09/2017.

In both occasions I gave an overview of the research path and shared possible theoretical interpretations. I received very interesting and conflicting feedbacks. My guess is that the contrast  stems from  different approaches or paradigms.

A plurality of paradigms has always occupied the field of social science, and at times one paradigm partially prevailed others. When the heuristic potential of a paradigm seemed to supersede others, we assisted to “turns,” whether linguistic, cultural, narrative, etc. Are we facing another turn in the field of social sciences? Alternatively, is it time for the end of all “turns”? Wouldn’t it be more useful, and probably scientifically adequate, to contemplate a pluralism of paradigms? We can take into consideration different objections to theoretical pluralism. The strongest one is “monism”.  The monist objection in its rough version could be so summarized: one of the contending positions is valid and all the rest are wrong, misleading, or unimportant. In a more sophisticated way: alternative approaches are historically valid but currently outmoded, as necessary but transient stages in the evolution of current true belief, or as partially valid positions which need to be incorporated in a more embracing theoretical synthesis. The heart of methodological and theoretical pluralism is instead the belief that two or more divergent positions may be entirely acceptable. Georg Simmel created the first major body of argumentation to support theoretical pluralism in the social sciences. The essence of Simmel’s metatheory consists in his refusal of a definitive synthesis.

“There can be no unification based on objective content, but only one achieved by a subject who can regard both positions. By sensing the reverberations of spiritual existence in the distance opened up by these opposites, the soul grows, despite, indeed, because of, the fact that it does not decide in favor of one of the parties” (Simmel, 1907/1991, 181).

Simmel, G.  (1907/1991) Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.